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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Wayfair and the Retroactivity of Constitutional Holdings
by Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage
The primary issue that the U.S. Supreme 
Court will address in South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. 
is whether the Court should overturn its long-
standing physical presence rule. However, if the 
Court were to overturn this rule, it may also 
choose to resolve a second question — whether 
its reversal would apply retroactively or 
prospectively only. If the holding were to apply 
retroactively, that would mean that remote 
vendors could be liable for years of back taxes, 
with no real opportunity to collect those taxes 
from their customers. The impact of that could 
be highly problematic.1
The retroactivity issue is of critical 
importance, and it did receive attention from 
both parties in their merits briefs, as well as in 
the briefs of many amici.2 But the issue was not 
nearly as fleshed out as the substantive issue in 
the case, and the retroactivity issue deserves 
more discussion to make clear that the Court is 
not bound to reverse Quill on a retroactive basis 
either now or later (if it is to repeal Quill at all). 
This article elaborates by evaluating the 
doctrinal foundation of the Court’s retroactivity 
doctrine and by analyzing why Wayfair differs 
from cases in which the Court required its 
decisions to be applied retroactively. To 
summarize the argument, a prospective-only 
application of a new rule in Wayfair would be 
more than justified and would be consistent 
with the Court’s doctrine in this area of law.
The Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine
One of the foundational elements of the rule 
of law and American jurisprudence is that 
people should have an opportunity to 
understand what the law is before being held 
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In this edition of 
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the authors 
examine how the U.S. Supreme Court could 
issue a prospective-only ruling in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair Inc.
1
That is, assuming that any states would act to collect retroactive tax 
liabilities, an eventuality that 40 states argue is unlikely in their amicus 
brief. States’ Amicus Brief at 19-20, South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., No. 17-
494 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018).
2
See, e.g., Petitioner’s Brief at 48-51, South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., No. 
17-494 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018); and Respondents’ Brief at 62-65, South Dakota 
v. Wayfair Inc., No. 17-494 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2018); States’ Amicus Brief at 19-
21, The argument of this essay elaborates on arguments made in the 
States’ brief in particular.
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accountable for violations of its mandates.3 One 
aspect of this principle is that we generally 
disfavor retroactively punishing conduct based 
on new laws. This is reflected in various places 
in our legal system, including the U.S. 
Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto 
laws, and in a general judicial presumption that 
legislation is applied only prospectively.4
That general rule gives way in the realm of 
judicial pronouncements, however, where there 
has developed a norm of retroactivity. This arises 
from a prominent theory of judicial power that 
reasons that judges have the power to issue 
retroactive decisions because their role is to 
announce what the law “is” or “was,” not what it 
“shall be.”5 A statute that is held to be inconsistent 
with the Constitution, for example, is not 
inconsistent only from that point on or only 
regarding the parties involved in the particular 
case. The statute was always inconsistent with the 
Constitution. Any other approach would allow 
Courts to be the writer of laws rather than the 
interpreter of laws, according to this philosophy.
The Supreme Court has struggled with this 
issue and with other issues that retroactivity can 
cause. Applying a constitutional holding 
retroactively could impose significant costs on 
parties who have relied on the Court’s prior 
precedent or on the law as it was enacted. That 
cost might outweigh the benefits of a retroactive 
application, and a prospective ruling might 
provide greater net benefits. The Court addressed 
this tension with its 1971 decision in Chevron Oil v. 
Huson6 in which it pulled together three factors 
from its prior cases for evaluating whether a 
prospective-only ruling is appropriate. Under the 
Chevron Oil framework, the Court looks to (1) 
whether the Court’s decision establishes a new 
principle of law, either by overruling prior law or 
by deciding a question of first impression that was 
not “clearly foreshadowed”; (2) whether 
retroactive application would undermine the 
operation of the new rule, given its purpose and 
effect; and (3) whether retroactive application 
would cause injustice or hardship.7
Chevron Oil and Tax Statutes
The Chevron Oil factors suggest that the Court 
could easily justify applying a reversal of Quill on 
a prospective basis only. The Court clearly would 
be overruling prior law. Retroactive application 
would undermine the purpose of the Court’s 
dormant commerce clause doctrine, which is to 
protect interstate commerce while respecting state 
autonomy.8 And a retroactive holding would 
clearly cause injustice or hardship on remote 
vendors — they could be liable for years of past 
taxes that they otherwise could have collected 
from their customers. Retroactive liability 
wouldn’t just place them in the same position as if 
the physical presence rule were never imposed by 
the Court, it would make them worse off.
Why does Wayfair argue that a reversal of 
Quill would have to apply retroactively? That 
position stems from a gradual erosion of Chevron 
Oil that can be seen in the Court’s cases since the 
1970s. Key among those are three state tax cases 
from the early 1990s.9 The first, American 
Trucking Associations v. Smith,10 was a case 
involving a flat highway tax identical to one the 
Court had struck down as unconstitutionally 
discriminatory during pendency of that 
dispute.11 The issue presented to the Court was 
whether that intervening decision would be 
applied to the case at hand. Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor applied Chevron Oil and answered 
that question in the negative, but her opinion on 
3
Lon L. Fuller, “The Morality of Law,” 51-53 Yale U.S. Press 1969) 
(referring to the prospectivity of law as one of his eight criteria for an act 
to be considered as “law”); and Landgraf v. USI Film Production, 511 U.S. 
244, 265 (1994) (“the presumption against retroactive legislation is 
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine 
centuries older than our Republic”).
4
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 3; and U.S. Const. Art. I, section 10, cl. 
1. See generally Richard S. Kay, “Retroactivity and Prospectivity of 
Judgments in American Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 
62, July 2014, at 37, 38.
5
See Kay, id. at 49-50 (describing this judicial philosophy and likening 
it to a “Blackstonian view of adjudication”); and American Trucking 
Association, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“prospective 
decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say 
what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be”).
6




See Thimmesch, “A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause,” Mich. L. Rev. Online (2018), at 101, 104-105.
9
The Court had, at that time, already retreated from its willingness to 
apply its decisions on a prospective-only basis in criminal procedure 
matters. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1986).
10
496 U.S. 167 (1990).
11
See American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
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that issue garnered the support of only a plurality 
of the justices.12
The next year, the Supreme Court decided 
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, which 
involved the question whether the decision in 
Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias13 would apply 
retroactively.14 Bacchus was another 
discrimination case, and the Court determined 
that it did apply retroactively notwithstanding 
Chevron Oil, but it could not muster a majority 
opinion on why. O’Connor’s dissent, which Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy joined, applied Chevron Oil and 
mentioned the “potentially devastating liability” 
that retroactivity can cause.15 The majority 
opinion did not apply Chevron Oil at all.
James Beam left the status of the Chevron Oil 
doctrine unclear, but the Court struck a much 
deeper blow to that doctrine very shortly 
thereafter in Harper v. Virginia.16 That case again 
involved the retroactivity of a court’s decision that 
a state statute was unconstitutionally 
discriminatory.17 Justice Clarence Thomas wrote 
the majority opinion in Harper and all but closed 
the opportunity for prospective-only decisions. 
After reviewing Chevron Oil and its progeny, he 
noted that:
When this Court applies a rule of federal 
law to the parties before it, that rule is the 
controlling interpretation of federal law 
and must be given full retroactive effect in 
all cases still open on direct review and as 
to all events, regardless of whether such 
events predate or postdate our 
announcement of the rule.18
For many, that seems to have marked the end 
of the retroactivity debate.
Prospective Rulings After Harper
Thomas’s opinion in Harper certainly did not 
seem to leave a great amount of room for 
prospective-only judgments. But it didn’t entirely 
foreclose them either. The precise issue addressed 
by the Harper Court was whether lower courts 
could reject retroactivity when the Court had not 
done so itself.19 This says nothing of whether the 
Court can issue a prospective-only judgment of its 
own accord.
The real takeaway from Harper is about the 
Court’s desire for consistency of application 
between parties. The Court was critical of 
“selective prospectivity,” which is when “a court 
applies the new rule to the parties before it but not 
to other conduct predating the court’s 
judgment.”20 That is inconsistent with many 
justices’ views of how courts and the rule of law 
should operate. But it does not mean that Chevron 
Oil is bad law or that the Court cannot issue 
prospective-only rulings in appropriate 
circumstances. The Court still has that option, and 
Wayfair presents the precise fact situation for 
which that is proper. We base this conclusion on 
several factors.
To start, much judicial action under the 
dormant commerce clause is quasi-legislative in 
nature. The dormant commerce clause represents 
the Court’s attempt to protect the negative 
implications of the commerce clause, which 
directly grants Congress an affirmative power to 
regulate interstate commerce.21 It is only when 
Congress does not act under the commerce clause 
12
American Trucking Associations v. Smith, 496 U.S. at 179-183. Notably, 
Justice O’Connor justified prospectivity based, in part, on the inequity of 
potentially retroactively imposing taxes on previously “favored 
taxpayers.” Id. at 182-183. Justice Scalia joined the majority in denying 
relief to the taxpayer, but he did not agree with the plurality opinion on 
retroactivity.Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that 
“the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular 
decision could take prospective form does not make sense”).
13
486 U.S. 263 (1984).
14
501 U.S. 529 (1991).
15
James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 558 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
16
509 U.S. 86 (1993). Note that this is the first of these cases that 
occurred after Quill was handed down in 1992.
17
This case was a bit different in that the statute at issue was not 
discriminatory under the dormant commerce clause, but in violation of 
the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 
89-91; see also Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 
(1989).
18
Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
19
Id. at 97-98 (rejecting the Virginia Supreme Court’s application of 
Chevron Oil “[w]hen this Court does not ‘reserve the question of whether 
its holding should be applied to the parties before it’”); and id. at 98 
(noting that state courts have a “legal imperative ‘to apply a rule of 
federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done 
so’”) (emphasis added). Lower courts have latched on to that language to 
preserve some room for prospective-only rulings. See Daniel Hemel, 
“There Is No Retroactivity Concern With Overruling Quill,” Whatever 
Source Derived (Jan. 28, 2018).
20
Kay, supra note 4, at 48 (internal quotations omitted).
21
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 3.
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that the Court has a role under the negative or 
dormant commerce clause. If the Court acts, 
though, it does so to some extent by exercising 
federal legislativelike power to proscribe some 
state conduct; this is of course why the clause 
remains controversial among some justices. As 
noted above, the Court’s default position 
regarding legislative enactments is that they 
apply prospectively only.22 The table is flipped, and 
so if there is any area of the law where the 
presumption in favor of retroactivity should be 
relaxed it is regarding the dormant commerce 
clause. The special role of the dormant commerce 
clause is further indicated by the fact that, unlike 
in other areas of constitutional law, this is an area 
in which Congress can overturn a constitutional 
ruling of the Supreme Court.23
Of course, much of the erosion of Chevron Oil 
in the early 1990s occurred in dormant 
commerce clause cases. However, all those cases 
raised the issue of unlawful discrimination, an 
aspect of the dormant commerce clause that even 
Justice Antonin Scalia embraced.24 The states 
involved had collected taxes in unconstitutional 
ways, and issuing a retroactive ruling meant that 
the states had to provide relief to all parties 
affected by those actions — not just to the litigant 
who brought the challenge. To hold to the 
contrary would allow states to act in a 
discriminatory way with no real downside. They 
would get to keep the resulting revenue.25
The analysis here could be put another way. 
Though surely the Court did not rely on Chevron 
Oil in these cases, we might say that these cases 
should have gone the same way even if the Court 
had applied Chevron Oil’s three factors. In a 
discrimination case, the Court is applying well-
established old rules, and injustice would be 
caused by prospective-only application, as 
opposed to retroactive application.
Thus, a ruling for South Dakota in Wayfair 
would be fundamentally different from these 
other post-Chevron Oil cases because the issue in 
this case is not about state discrimination. This 
observation has several implications. First, 
ruling prospectively would not permit the states 
to retain any ill-gotten gains. Second, and 
conversely, ruling prospectively would protect 
remote vendors who relied on a prior ruling by 
the Court. These vendors did not trench upon the 
polestar of the dormant commerce clause, 
namely the anti-discrimination principle, nor 
commit any other wrong, and so placing the 
burden of the Court’s mistake on these vendors 
goes to exactly the concern with injustice that 
animates Chevron Oil’s third prong.26 Returning 
to our alternative framing, the Court has not 
encountered a case in which prospectivity is so 
important as in Wayfair, and should return to 
application of Chevron Oil.
Taken together, the legal issue and the factual 
posture presented in Wayfair are sufficiently 
different from the traditional cases that have 
come before the Court that a prospective-only 
ruling is more than justified on those grounds.
Retroactive Application Would Unduly Burden 
Interstate Commerce
Even if most of the justices do not agree that 
Chevron Oil is still valid or that a prospective-
only ruling is otherwise proper, the Court could 
still effectively prohibit states from imposing 
retroactive liabilities on vendors post-Quill. That 
is because the application of retroactive liabilities 
would violate the dormant commerce clause by 
imposing undue burdens on interstate 
commerce.
22
Landgraf v. USI Film Production, 511 U.S. 244, 265, (1994) (“the 
presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our 
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our 
Republic”).
23
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (noting that “Congress has the ultimate 
power to resolve” dormant commerce clause issues).
24
Not necessarily enthusiastically. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. 
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (“I will, on stare decisis grounds, enforce a 
self-executing `negative’ Commerce Clause in two situations: (1) against 
a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and 
(2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law 
previously held unconstitutional by this Court. Applying this approach 
— or at least the second part of it — is not always easy, since once one 
gets beyond facial discrimination our negative-Commerce-Clause 
jurisprudence becomes (and long has been) a `quagmire.’”) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (internal citations omitted).
25
States could alternatively seek to collect tax from the previously 
favored class of in-state taxpayers, but that could obviously prove to be 
difficult. See Jerome R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, and John A. 
Swain, State Taxation, para. 4.17 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing potential 
remedies for state tax statutes determined to be unconstitutionally 
discriminatory).
26
Of course, concern with the reliance interest of vendors might lead 
one to the conclusion that Quill should not be overturned at all, but this 
can’t be correct. Mistakes that generate reliance cannot become 
unassailable, though rule of law considerations clearly indicate the 
Court must proceed with care.
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Understanding this argument starts with 
first appreciating that the Court’s current nexus 
doctrine serves as nothing more than a proxy for 
assessing when a state tax collection requirement 
burdens interstate commerce in a way that is not 
justified by the local interest in tax collection.27 
This type of balancing is not a tax-specific task; it 
is something the Court does regarding all types 
of state regulations. In nontax situations, the 
Court does not use a nexus test though. It applies 
something referred to as Pike balancing.28 The 
Pike formulation is as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits. If a 
legitimate local purpose is found, then the 
question becomes one of degree. And the 
extent of the burden that will be tolerated 
will of course depend on the nature of the 
local interest involved, and on whether it 
could be promoted as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate activities.29
That balancing approach is intended to 
identify state regulations that go “too far” and 
that thus unduly burden interstate commerce.30 
The Court has found it difficult to apply this test 
to particular facts,31 but the imposition of 
retroactive liabilities only on vendors engaged in 
interstate commerce could easily be characterized 
as a state action that unduly burdens interstate 
commerce using this approach.
That conclusion stems from first identifying 
the burden that retroactive liabilities would 
impose on vendors. In this situation, the burden 
of a retroactive statute would be that vendors who 
relied on the physical presence rule would find 
themselves liable for years of back taxes. And 
those back taxes wouldn’t be taxes they would 
have paid from their own funds in any event. 
They otherwise would have collected the tax from 
their customers — and maybe even have received 
compensation for doing so under states’ vendor-
compensation programs. Retroactive liability in 
this context would be an incredibly high burden.
If current estimates are to be believed, we are 
talking about liabilities in the tens of billions of 
dollars per year.32 Multiply that by many years, or 
decades, of non-collection, and we are talking 
about a huge potential liability for remote 
vendors. That burden could bankrupt many 
online vendors.
That burden is also particularly undue because 
it would arise from retailers’ reliance on the Court 
and its prevailing constitutional interpretation 
and not from their own ignorance of the law or 
from aggressive tax positions. States also had the 
opportunity to collect this revenue in past years 
from their state residents or by challenging Quill 
themselves.33 They had mechanisms available to 
collect this tax without imposing this burden on 
vendors who relied on the Court’s prevailing 
constitutional interpretation. The imposition of 
retroactive liabilities would thus fairly be called 
into question under Pike.
Resolving Wayfair Without a 
Retroactivity Problem
The foregoing analysis reveals that the Court 
could resolve Wayfair (or a post-Wayfair case) in 
several ways without permitting retroactive 
liabilities for remote vendors who relied on Quill. 
First, it could explicitly make its reversal of Quill 
27
See Thimmesch, supra note 8, at 106-108; see also Amicus Curiae 
Brief of Four U.S. Senators in Support of Petitioner at 15-16, South Dakota 
v. Wayfair Inc., No. 17-494 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018); and Brief of the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-19, South Dakota v. 
Wayfair Inc., No. 17-494 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018).
28
This stems from the application of that balancing test in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
29
Id. (internal citation omitted).
30
See South Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945).
31
See Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) (noting the 
“institutional difficulty” of doing Pike balancing); see also Dan T. Coenen, 
“Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State Self-
Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause,” 95 Iowa L. Rev. 
541, 568-569, 624-627 (2010) (questioning Pike’s balancing test); Brannon 
P. Denning, “Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,” 
50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 417, 453-458 (2008) (noting common critiques of 
Pike’s balancing test); and Donald H. Regan, “The Supreme Court and 
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,” 
84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1092 (arguing that “[d]espite what the Court has 
said, it has not been balancing”).
32
Donald Bruce, William F. Fox, and LeAnn Luna, “E-Tailer Sales Tax 
Nexus and State Tax Policies,” 68 Nat’l Tax J. 735, 736 (2015); and U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, “States Could Gain Revenue From 
Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are Likely to Experience 
Compliance Costs,” GAO-18-114 (Nov. 2017).
33
See Hemel, supra note 19.
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prospective only, based on Chevron Oil. The 
equities certainly lay with this option and it is not 
foreclosed by existing law.
The facts in Wayfair also present a particularly 
favorable case for the Court to issue a prospective-
only ruling — based on Chevron Oil without 
undermining the adjudicatory principle that the 
law should apply equally to all similarly situated 
parties. Prospective-only judgments arguably 
violate that principle because they allow the 
parties to a particular case to be governed by the 
“new law” while other parties who engaged in the 
same activity during the same period are not. 
Justice John Marshall Harlan II offered a direct 
critique of that aspect of prospective-only 
judgments, labeling the issuance of such a ruling 
as “[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of 
appellate review, using it as a vehicle for 
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and 
then permitting a stream of similar cases 
subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new 
rule.”34 If this is a concern of the current justices, it 
is not one that is implicated by Wayfair.
There are several features of this litigation that 
permit the justices to avoid this “selective 
prospectivity” worry. First, South Dakota is not 
trying to collect taxes from remote vendors for 
any prior period; the state drafted its law so that it 
imposed tax collection obligations only for 
periods after the law is upheld in court. 35 Second, 
because of the procedural posture of the case, 
there are not specific litigants who would be 
subject to a different rule. This case came to the 
courts as an action for declaratory judgment. 
Thus, the Court could overrule Quill on a 
prospective basis and uphold the South Dakota 
law without giving rise to any inconsistent 
application of the law to other parties. This is also 
not a situation in which South Dakota would 
benefit from the Court’s ruling to the exclusion of 
other states. To the contrary, a prospective-only 
ruling would put all states — and all vendors — 
in the same position for all periods of time. None 
could impose tax collection obligations based on 
economic nexus concepts before the Court’s 
decision. Prospectively applying a reversal of 
Quill in Wayfair would not involve “selective 
prospectivity.”36 Prospectivity would be the 
position for all.
Alternatively, the Court could apply its 
holding prospectively but narrow Chevron Oil 
further. The Court might take note, for instance, of 
the special common law nature of the dormant 
commerce clause or the federalism implication if 
retroactivity concerns are to prevent the Court 
from overturning incorrect limitations on state 
power.
There are more options. The Court could 
uphold the South Dakota law but clarify in dicta 
that a retroactive statute would have posed 
serious constitutional concerns. Alternatively, the 
Court could explain in dicta that a state seeking to 
impose a use tax collection obligation 
retroactively would likely face an uphill battle 
under Pike. Or the Court can say nothing and 
instead rely on the lower courts to apply Pike and 
the presumption against retroactive legislation in 
the first instance.
In the end, this discussion shows that a 
reversal of Quill would not necessarily mean a 
world where vendors could face retroactive 
liability because they relied on the physical 
presence rule of Quill. A more rational result can 
easily be obtained. The Court should not be 
swayed by arguments to the contrary. 
34
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring and dissenting).
35
The law allowed the state to file a declaratory judgment action to 
determine the permissibility of the statute’s economic nexus provisions. 
S.B. 106 section 2. Also, the filing of such an action operated as an 
injunction against the state from enforcing the legislation’s tax collection 
obligations. Id. at section 3. Section 5 of the law provides that “[n]o 
obligation to remit the sales tax required . . . may be applied 
retroactively.” Id. at section 5.
36
See supra note 20.
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